NEHA March 2023 Journal of Environmental Health

ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCE

seen and prevented. And its eects could have been mitigated by a more eective human response” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012). Unlike Chernobyl, all three in-service reactor cores melted 100% within the first week of the Fukushima nuclear disaster due to the cool- ant loss event, lack of backup power sources, and poor planning (Eddy & Sase, 2015; World Nuclear Association, 2022). Almost 5 years later, o‹cials at Tokyo Elec- tric Power Company (TEPCO) in a June 21, 2016, interview with the media apologized for not admitting the reactor meltdowns, referring to the omission as a premeditated cover-up (Yamaguchi, 2016).Radiation con- tinued to be released as concerns rose that Japan downplayed the severity of the threat to global health and was not transparent in communications (Grossman, 2011; James et al., 2011; Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, 2019). Approxi- mately 1,800 km 2 of land in Fukushima Pre- fecture was contaminated by radiation (The National Diet of Japan, 2012). Foods con- taining radiation above regulatory thresholds were restricted in Japan by the government and some foods (e.g., raw milk, mushrooms) were restricted from international export from Japan. The Food and Drug Adminis- tration (2021) in the U.S. provided import alerts in coordination with Japan. More than 150,000 people were displaced from their homes at the peak point and some might never be able to return (The National Diet of Japan, 2012). Bags of Contaminated Soil and Debris Excavated radioactive soils and debris— including those accumulated from mitigation processes during 2011 through approximately 2019—are bagged and stored outdoors, and thus are vulnerable to extreme weather. On October 10, 2019, Super Typhoon Hagibis peaked as a Category 5 storm with 160 mph winds and made landfall on October 12, 2019, as a Category 2 storm (Masters, 2020). Shortly after the storm, media and individuals via social networks began to post pictures of the broken bags. Each bag is designed to hold 1 ton of radiologically contaminated soil. Some bags were floating down local streams. One source stated that 91 bags of contaminated soil had been washed away during the typhoon (SimplyInfo.org, 2019). O‹cials in Japan veri- fied that of the dozens of bags reported lost,

11 were retrieved and found empty (Minis- try of the Environment, 2019). The bags are not watertight, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (2015). Contaminated Groundwater The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was built in between a mountain range and the Pacific Ocean, on top of a shallow ground- water table that is continuously replenished from mountain runo. Groundwater that infiltrated damaged reactor building units and groundwater in direct and indirect con- tact with highly radioactive reactor corium (i.e., molten reactor core material) was mixed with stored cooling waters used to control the reactor vessels. The resulting mixture was stored in mammoth containers. Approximately 1,000 storage tanks were set up progressively, including initially 350 steel tanks with rubber seams, each holding 1,200 m 3 . A few of these storage tanks devel- oped leaks in 2013 (World Nuclear Associa- tion, 2022). It was originally estimated that storage would be exhausted by 2020 and Japan now plans to discharge the tanks into the Pacific Ocean, involving 1 million tons of wastewater containing tritium (Green- peace International, 2019). On April 13, 2021, the prime minister of Japan stated, “This is an unavoidable issue in proceeding with decommissioning. We will ensure the safety of treated water and take all measures to dispel rumors” (“Decision to Release Treated Water,” 2021). Greenpeace Ger- many has condemed the discharges—that have been approved and are to be overseen by International Atomic Energy Agency—by stating that the employed treatment sys- tem cannot remove tritium, carbon-14, and strontium-90 (Burnie, 2020). Compound Natural and Human- Caused Disaster Technologies required to perform never- before-achieved mitigation and decommis- sioning processes at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant elevate the threat of the radio- logical hazards and prolong the threat into the future. Reactor corium might release radiation through uncontrolled fission reactions result- ing from criticality or recriticality, which is the main hazard when handling nuclear fuel residues in damaged units (“The Long Road Ahead,” 2021; Smirnov et al., 2020).

On January 27, 2021, approximately 10 years after the disaster, a Japanese newspaper reported high levels of radiation in reactor Unit 1, 20–40 petaBq (PBq) in Unit 2, and approximately 30 PBq in Unit 3 (the prefix peta indicates 1,000 trillion). The newspa- per also stated that the dose could be fatal to a human standing near the area over a 2-hr period (“High Radiation Facilities,” 2021). Decommissioning processes are projected to end between 2051 and 2061 (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2022). On February 13, 2021, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake caused further damage of cool- ant tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, necessitating the generation of even higher volumes of contaminated water as makeup coolant was required to be added (Associated Press, 2021; Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2021). Another magnitude 5.3 aftershock occurred the same day, dem- onstrating vulnerabilities of a fragile nuclear power system to the disaster-prone climate of Japan (Keane, 2021). On March 16, 2022, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake impacted the Fukushima Dai- ichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing an auto- matic reactor Unit 5 coolant pump power shutdown, fire alarm activation, and coolant tank spillage. Although the alarm for radioac- tive liquid leakage sounded as a result of the earthquake, a TEPCO (2022) report stated that coolant waters did not drop. Damaged, spent nuclear fuel rods and con- tinuing reactor core instability increased the potential for future fuel meltdowns (Eddy & Sase, 2015; Smirnov et al., 2020). These fac- tors extend the vulnerabilities of the power plant to extreme weather worsened by cli- mate change, the constant possibility of tech- nological disturbance through mitigation and remediation processes, and attacks through terrorism or acts of war. A long-term perspective of the Fukushima nuclear disaster requires an appreciation for the placement of Japan at the intersec- tion of four major geological tectonic plates within the infamous Ring of Fire (Israel, 2022). As one of the highest-risk areas in the world seismically (Wang & Nasseri, 2021), decades of remediation likely will be problematic. Some have estimated a 70–80% probability of an earthquake with a magni- tude of 8 to 9 occurring over the next 30 years (JiJi Press, 2021).

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Volume 85 • Number 7

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