ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCE
As Schnake-Mahl et al. (2022) point out, closing indoor dining caused lots of resis- tance and might not be viable over the long term. Improving ventilation might be more successful and does not have to be expen- sive (LaPook, 2024; Pequignot, 2022). Con- tact tracing, already in place for other com- municable diseases, was expanded to help control COVID-19. There is evidence that these actions and similar ones around the world prevented millions of infections and deaths (Capon et al., 2021; Hernandez, 2020; Schnake-Mahl et al., 2022). China went through drastic lockdowns early in the pandemic, but after widespread protests, the government relaxed all the pro- tocols, and in late 2022 were poised to expe- rience the disaster they had avoided (Ram- meloo, 2022). Predictive Modeling for COVID-19 As of early spring 2023, predictive modeling for COVID-19 analogous to models described previously in this article for foodborne dis- eases was impossible because no inspections were being carried out to enforce COVID-19 restrictions, even though these inspections had saved as many as 590,902 lives (Bollyky et al., 2023). Further, also as of early spring 2023, COVID-19 and other viral respiratory dis- eases appeared to be on the wane, and it might have been unrealistic to expect much cooperation from the public with any miti- gation strategies. According to Bracken (2023), as of March 8, 2023, a record low share of Americans (53%) were concerned about the new Omicron variant, which was down 3 percentage points from February and represented an all-time low for track- ing concern. Also in March 2023, The New York Times ended its daily COVID-19 data collection, although at that time, the dis- ease was still causing deaths across the U.S. (Andrews & Jones, 2023). Furthermore, the COVID Tracking Project and Johns Hopkins University online databases also closed. On April 10, 2023, President Joe Biden signed a bipartisan congressional resolution to end the COVID-19 national emergency (“Biden Ends,” 2023). The week before, ending April 5, 2023, 1,773 people in the U.S. died of COVID-19. The national emergency was first declared on January 31, 2020, and ended on May 11, 2023.
TABLE 3
Phases Toward Standardized Data Processes and Systems
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
• Paper and pencil field data collection, multiple points of data transfer • Minimal data entry quality controls • Manual cleaning of data • Multiple points of data collection, entry, and transfer • Data fields not yet standardized
• Electronic field data collection • Defined data fields and data types, including a data dictionary (i.e., a set of information describing the contents, format, and structure of a database and the relationship between its elements) • Data required to be synchronized or uploaded into the system database once an inspector reaches their office or home office • Reports available to the public • Data systems siloed and restricted data sharing • Some analysis of the data
• Automatic synchronization from electric field collection to database • Integration of data from other sources (e.g., pictures, GIS information) • Automated data cleaning and reconciliation • Custom reports available to the public, the ability for the public to query data • Share data across systems • Data sharing agreements with other agencies • Use of data to analyze, interpret, and drive actions and provide real-time insights
Source: Coleman et al., 2022.
In a review of the Cleveland Study (Din- gle et al., 1964) mentioned previously in this article (see Impacts section), Banks (2022) says: After such mountainous labour it is sad to learn that the data do not at present lead to conclusions on practical methods of prevention and control, largely because the aetiology of most of the illnesses was not determinable at the time. In other words the labour seems to have been pre- mature. It is hoped that the voluminous data accumulated at such cost, especially on the common respiratory diseases, may be of value in future when more is known about causative agents. If these restrictions and specialized inspec- tions are ever resumed should another pan- demic occurs, predictive modeling could help focus inspections. The Delaware County, Ohio, inspection report (Table 1) and the mitigation strategies in use in U.S. food industrial facilities before vaccine availability (Table 2) could be adapted. Contact tracing could help identify COVID- 19 or other disease risks in various venues. This process would have to be done early in a pandemic when the caseload is light (Capon et
al., 2021; Hartman, 2020b; Hernandez, 2020). A strategy such as FINDER could also be used.
Conclusion and Recommendations
We have seen that both foodborne illness and COVID-19 and other respiratory patho- gens continue to be public health problems despite surveillance and control e¤orts. We o¤er some recommendations arising from this article specifically, as well as some from external sources. Some may question the utility of o¤ering more recommendations about COVID-19 when the public generally believes the pan- demic is over. But surely there is still a reason to o¤er the USDA’s Food Guide Pyramid or to recommend smoking cessation or seatbelt use. This case is no di¤erent. Foodborne Disease A symposium at the International Associa- tion for Food Protection (IAFP) 2019 Annual Meeting asked, “Why are we still having food safety failures if we all have food safety sys- tems?” (Prince, 2019). The first speaker, Gale Prince, answered this question by saying it was because of an ongoing failure with so-
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Volume 88 • Number 2
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